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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Computers have become a principal means for storing both personal and business 
information for large numbers of people.  In addition, with the increasing use of the 
Internet and e-mail many people use computers as a means of accessing information 
and communicating with others both in personal and business contexts.  People 
increasingly store and manipulate accounting and business records with computer 
systems.  At the same time, commercially available computerized accounting 
software has dropped significantly in price and has become increasingly easy to use.  
At one time, maintaining a detailed and accurate set of accounting records was 
beyond the ability of all but well trained and experienced professionals.  Today, 
however, persons with little or no accounting or business background are able 
competently to maintain their business and accounting records.  The trend is one of 
greater availability and constantly dropping prices. As this trend continues, we will 
see an increased use of computers by all sectors of the population.  Along with the 
use of computerized record keeping and communication in legitimate enterprise has 
come the use of the same technology by criminal enterprises in carrying out their 
activities. 
As a result of this trend, computer storage devices have increasingly become the 
targets of government investigations of criminal activity.  The government has used 
evidence gathered from computers countless times in criminal prosecutions.  The 
methods by which government officials seek to gather evidence from computers 
couple with the limits placed on the state by the United States Constitution, and the 
courts raise critical issues of personal privacy for all citizens who use computers in 
their daily lives. 
This note will discuss legal issues related to search and seizure of computers and 
define the trend that the law is taking in the emerging area of inquiry.  Personal 
privacy protection will be adequate regarding computer searches and seizures only if 
the courts properly balance the government’s interests in bringing criminals to justice 
against citizens’ interests against  overly broad inquiries into the personal affairs.  
The government’s interest cannot be placed so high that all areas of one’s personal 
life becomes the subject of governmental scrutiny.  This inquiry will proceed in 
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several parts. Section II provides a limited general discussion  of constitutional 
limitations on search and seizure.  Section III will discuss search and seizure of 
computers in the context of the “plain view” doctrine as an exception to the general 
requirement of a warrant for searches and seizures and will show that the “plain 
view” doctrine does not apply to closed computer files.  Section IV will focus on 
search and seizure of computers based on information provided by private party 
informants. While the government may make use of informant provided information, 
the use is limited and subject to specific criteria. The note will examine the scope of 
search and seizure and particularity of warrants with regard to the problem of 
intermingled documents and the closed container analogy in Section V.  A brief 
review of the grand jury subpoena process, as an alternative to the search warrant, 
will be considered in Section VI.  In closing, this note will summarize the general 
direction that computer search and seizure law has taken and provide comments as to 
the appropriateness of the direction that the law has taken.   
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and 
certain governmental invasions into private affairs.  The Fourth Amendment 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.1 
                                                                
1U.S. CONST. amend. IV.   
The history of the Fourth Amendment indicates that it was drafted  in reaction to the use 
of general warrants in England that the drafters of the Constitution considered to be an 
unreasonable intrusion into privacy that should be prohibited.  I WAYNE R. LaFave, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, 5-7 (1996).  The Fourth 
Amendment, as adopted, is both brief and ambiguous.  Id.  The Fourth Amendment gives no 
definition of “unreasonable” and does not set forth detailed information regarding the 
conditions for proper issuance of a warrant.  Id. 
Another commentator noted that: 
Moreover, the Fourth Amendment, more than many other parts of the Constitution, 
appears to require a fairly high level of abstraction of purpose; its use of the term 
“reasonable” (actually “unreasonable”) positively invites construction that change 
with changing circumstances.  Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First 
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 823-24 (1994). 
If we accept this proposition - that the construction of the Fourth Amendment’s 
“reasonableness” clause should properly change over time to accommodate constitutional 
purposes more general than the Framer’s specific intentions . . . focus on colonial history to 
support a disjunctive reading of the “reasonableness” clause and the Warrant Clause and to 
attack the exclusionary rule seem short-sighted.  Such a focus ignores at least two crucial 
changes between colonial times and the present that must inform our current readings of the 
Fourth Amendment as a whole.  First, at the time of the drafting and ratifying of the Fourth 
Amendment, nothing even remotely resembling modern law enforcement existed.  The 
invention in the nineteenth century of armed, quasi-military, professional police forces, whose 
form, function, and daily presence differ dramatically from that of the colonial constabulary, 
requires that modern-day judges and scholars rethink both the relationship between 
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The protections of the Fourth Amendment apply equally to corporations as well 
as to natural persons.2 
The Court noted that in protecting privacy interests the courts must act as a check 
on “the  ‘well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officer’ who are a 
party of any system of law enforcement.”3  As a result, the Supreme Court has 
generally held that unless justified by an exception to the warrant requirement, all 
searches should proceed only after issuance of a warrant by a neutral and detached 
magistrate.4  It is a well-established doctrine that “searches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions.”5 
In addition, a neutral magistrate should only issue warrants after demonstration 
of probable cause that evidence of a particular crime will be found, and that the 
warrant must describe with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be 
seized.6  There are numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement including search 
incident to arrest, exigent circumstances, inventory searches and searches necessary 
to protect officers and others.7 
A Fourth Amendment enforcement doctrine, first discussed by the Court in 1914, 
is the exclusionary rule.8  The Court held that the courts should exclude from 
evidence any evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment  from any 
prosecution of the defendant from whom the items had been improperly seized.9  
Subject to certain exceptions,10 the exclusionary rule prohibits use of any evidence 
illegally obtained, testimony regarding observations made during the illegal search, 
and any evidence obtained in the illegal search may not be used as a basis for 
additional warrants concerning the matter under investigation.11 
The Court also views search and seizure in light of a reasonableness test, defined 
by Katz v. United States, to determine if a search warrant is required.12  The Katz test 
                                                          
“reasonableness” and “warrants” and the nature of Fourth Amendment remedies.  Second, the 
intensification of inter-racial conflict in our society . . . necessitate new constructions of the  
Fourth Amendment. Id. 
2General Motors Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977). 
3United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972) (quoting Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971)). 
4Id. at 316-17. 
5Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
6Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979). 
7California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
8Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
9Id. at 398. 
10See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897 (1984); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). 
11Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963). 
12Katz, 389 U.S. at 347. 
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has two parts: 1) does the individual have a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
item or items to be searched and 2) is the subjective expectation of privacy one that 
society is prepared to accept as reasonable.13  In California v. Greenwood, the Court 
held that although the defendants had a subjective expectation of privacy in garbage 
placed at the curb for collection, that expectation was not one which society was 
prepared to accept as reasonable.14  The courts have recognized that enclosed spaces 
like suitcases, footlockers, briefcases and other closed containers are generally 
subject to a very high level of privacy expectation.15   In addition, in 1967 the 
Supreme Court held that privacy expectations extend not only to tangible objects but 
to intangible items as well.16  When a privacy expectation exists with regard to the 
contents of a closed container, a warrant to search the containers contents will 
generally be required.17  There are, however, exceptions to the requirement to obtain 
a warrant to search the contents of a closed container. For example, the Court 
recognized that the government may search a vehicle without a warrant if the search 
is supported by probable cause, unlike homes or similar places.18   
In Carroll, the Court noted that there was an essential difference between a 
vehicle and a fixed structure, where the government may readily obtain a warrant, 
“because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in 
which the warrant must be sought.”19  In United States v. Ross, the Court held that 
searching an automobile without a warrant, when the search of the automobile was 
supported by probable cause, included the right to search closed containers or 
packages found in the automobile.20  This does not, however, mean that the 
government has an unlimited right to undertake warrantless searches of closed 
containers found in automobiles.  In United States v. Chadwick, the Court refused to 
extend the rationale of Carroll to a locked footlocker that the government had 
probable cause to believe contained marijuana.21  The Court refused to extend 
Carroll to this situation indicating that people have greater privacy expectations in 
luggage than in their automobiles.22  Police may secure seized luggage in anticipation 
of obtaining a warrant to search its contents, unlike the case however with 
automobiles that suspects may easily remove from the jurisdiction.23   
                                                                
13Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring). 
14California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988). 
15United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978). 
16Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 305 (1967). 
17United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1977). 
18Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
19Id. at 153. 
20United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
21United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). 
22Id. at 13. 
23Id. 
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The Court, in California v. Acevedo, limited the doctrine established in 
Chadwick.24  In Acevedo, the Court held that the government may undertake a 
warrantless search of a container located in an automobile, even if they only had 
probable cause to believe that the container held evidence of a crime and did not 
have probable cause to search the entire vehicle.25  Although an officer may take 
possession of a container in anticipation of obtaining a warrant to search its contents, 
that authority is separate from any authority to search through the contents of the 
container.26  Additionally, a district court  held that electronic storage devices, such 
as computers, enjoy the same privacy interest as any other closed container.27  Unlike 
the garbage in Greenwood28 where the expectation of privacy was not reasonable, a 
computer user should have little difficulty establishing a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the contents of their computer storage which society is likely to accept  as 
reasonable.  Of course, should the computer be located in an automobile, the 
government could argue under Acevedo29 and Ross30 that the government may have 
the right to search the computer without a warrant.  There are no reported cases of 
this scenario, but with the increased use of portable and laptop computers it may 
occur in the future.  Thus, while a computer is likely to enjoy the same Fourth 
Amendment protections as other closed containers, this protection clearly has limits 
and depends upon where the container is located. 
One does not lose their expectation of privacy in a closed container simply 
because it is temporarily out of their control.31  One court noted that such 
expectations of privacy “may well be at their most intense when such effects are 
deposited temporarily or kept semi-permanently in public places or under the general 
control of another.”32  Because a computer is not located in one’s home or not under 
one’s control does not lead to the loss of a reasonable expectation of privacy.  There 
are, however, circumstances under which computer users may lose their reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  Case law suggests that if a person abandons or otherwise 
disclaims his interest in property, the police may properly seize the items and the 
evidence can be properly admitted against the defendant.33  Thus if a computer user 
makes his equipment readily or routinely available to others, the computer user’s 
expectation of privacy may be diminished.    
The Court has held, additionally, that disclosure of information to third parties 
made voluntarily is done at the risk of loss of a privacy interest of the person making 
                                                                
24California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1982). 
25Id. 
26Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 100 (1980). 
27United States v. David, 756 F. Supp. 1385 (D.Nev. 1991). 
28Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 35. 
29Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 565. 
30Ross, 456 U.S. at 798. 
31Block, 590 F.2d at 541. 
32Id. 
33California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624, 629 (1991). 
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the disclosure.34  The persons to whom the information is disclosed may do with the 
information as they please including disclosing it to authorities.35  This becomes an 
issue when a computer is surrendered to a technician for repair and will be discussed 
in more detail in a later section on use of informants.  Furthermore, any 
computerized information found to fall within the “plain view” doctrine will also 
loose any expectation of privacy.  The “plain view” doctrine will be discussed in 
more detail in the next section. 
III.  THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE 
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the Court held that authorities may seize 
evidence without a warrant provided the evidence is in plain view.36 In Coolidge, the 
Court set forth the requirements for the plain view exception to the warrant 
requirement as follows:  1) the officer must be legally in a position to view the object 
that is in plain view; 2) the incriminating character of the object must be immediately 
apparent to the officer; and 3) the officer must have a lawful right to access the 
object itself.37  The Court additionally indicated that “the ‘plain view’ doctrine may 
not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until 
something incriminating . . . emerges.”38 
The Court again explored the limits of the plain view doctrine in Arizona v. 
Hicks.39  In Hicks, a suspect fired a bullet through the floor of his apartment injuring 
a man living below.40  Police arrived and entered the suspect’s apartment to search 
for evidence related to the shooting. 41  A police officer noticed several sets of 
expensive stereo equipment that seemed out of place in the suspect’s apartment.42  
The police officer suspected the suspect had stolen the components and moved 
several of them so that he could record their serial numbers.43  The officer telephoned 
police headquarters, who advised him that they were stolen, and he seized them.44  
The Court found that the officer’s moving of the equipment “did constitute a ‘search’ 
separate and apart from the search for the shooter, victims, and weapons that was the 
lawful objective of his entry into the apartment.”45  The Court concluded in Hicks 
                                                                
34Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 414 (1966). 
35Id. 
36Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433 (1971).  
37Id. at 466-67. Coolidge additionally required that the discovery of the object or evidence 
be inadvertent.  This requirement of inadvertent discovery was later dropped by the Court.  
See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990). 
38Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466. 
39Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). 
40Id. at 323. 
41Id. 
42Id. 
43Id. 
44Hicks, 480 U.S. at 321. 
45Id. at 324-25. 
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that the difference between “’looking’ at a suspicious object in plain view and 
‘moving’ it even a few inches is much more than trivial for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.”46  Thus, any action beyond the mere observation of an object will 
violate the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.   
In Horton v. California, the Court further refined the definition of the “plain 
view” doctrine.47  In Horton, the government executed a search warrant to look for 
stolen property and found none.48  The police did, however, discover in “plain view” 
weapons and other evidence which the police had reason to know was connected to 
the robbery under investigation.49  Thus, although the weapons were found in “plain 
view” their discovery was not inadvertent since the police were interested in finding 
such other evidence that connected the suspect with the robbery.50  The Court held 
“that even though inadvertence is a characteristic of most legitimate ‘plain view’ 
seizures, it is not a necessary condition.”51 
Scenarios involving computer search and seizure are somewhat different than the 
circumstances described in Hicks52 and Horton53 where the officer was in view of a 
physical object.  In searches involving computer systems the only thing that arguably 
could be in “plain view” is anything that is  displayed on the computer screen 
without any interference with the computer system by the government.  Since even 
the most trivial disturbance of an object under Hicks54 violates the  plain view 
doctrine the question remains whether closed computer files stored on a computer 
hard drive can ever fall within the plain view exception.  Reviewing the listing of 
computer files may indicate that the files contain graphics or pictures (such as those 
with .jpg or .gif extensions) just as other file extensions may suggest that they are 
database or word processing files.55  The contents of the files, however, cannot be 
determined unless one opens the file with the appropriate software and disturbing of 
the file by opening or accessing it with software is arguably enough to violate the 
“plain view” exception to the warrant requirement.  The incriminating character of a 
                                                                
46Id. at 325 
47Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990). 
48Id. at 131. 
49Id. 
50Id. 
51Id. at 130. 
52Hicks, 480 U.S. at 321. 
53Horton, 496 U.S. at 128. 
54Hicks, 480 U.S. at 321. 
55The Department of Justice, in discussing search and seizure of computers and computer 
files indicates that “if agents with a warrant to search a computer for evidence of narcotics 
trafficking find a long list of access codes taped to the computer monitor, the list should also 
be seized.”  The Department of Justice does not take the position that closed files in the 
computer’s memory or storage devices are ever in plain view.  Federal Guidelines for 
Searching and Seizing Computers (1994), Supplement (October 1997) and Supplement 
(January 1999), Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Computer Crime and Intellectual 
Property Section. <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime>. 
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closed computer file is not immediately apparent as incriminating and cannot fall 
within the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement as defined by 
Coolidge56, Hicks57, and Horton58. 
Two recent cases suggest that courts will not apply the “plain view” doctrine to 
closed computer files on a hard drive.  In United States v. Carey, a suspect was under 
investigation for illegal drug trafficking and while executing an arrest warrant the 
police noticed drug paraphernalia in plain view.59  A police officer asked the 
suspect’s consent to search his apartment which he gave fearing that the officers 
would trash his apartment if he did not consent.60  During the search police found 
quantities of various illegal drugs and two computers.61  Police seized the computers 
believing that they would either be subject to forfeiture or contain evidence of drug 
dealing and removed them to the police station.62  Later a warrant was obtained 
allowing the search of the computer files for “‘names, telephone numbers, ledger 
receipts, addresses, and other documentary evidence pertaining to the sale and 
distribution of controlled substances.’”63  
A detective searched the hard drives for text-based files related to the suspected 
drug activity using  relevant search words; the search produced no files related to any 
drug activity.64  Along with the other files the detective downloaded more than two 
hundred JPG or image files alleging that the image files could contain evidence 
pertinent to a drug investigation.65  Upon opening one JPG file, the detective 
discovered that the file contained child pornography.66  After discovering the first 
child pornography file he abandoned his search for drug related files and opened 
many JPG files that also appeared to contain images of child pornography.67  He did 
not, however, obtain a separate warrant to continue the search for child pornography 
after opening the first JPG file.68  The government argued that the child pornography 
files were in plain view and officers needed no separate search warrant.69   
                                                                
56Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 433. 
57Hicks, 408 U.S. at 321. 
58Horton, 496 U.S. at 128. 
59United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999). 
60Id. 
61Id. 
62Id. 
63Id. 
64Carey, 172 F.3d at 1270-71. 
65Id. at 1271. 
66Id.  
67Id. 
68Id. 
69Carey, 172 F.3d at 1272. 
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The court held that the detective expanded the scope of his search beyond that 
permitted by the warrant when he began opening JPG files.70  The court stated that 
after opening the first JPG file the detective “was in the same position as the officers 
had been when they first wanted to search the contents of the computers for drug 
related evidence.  They were aware they had to obtain a search warrant and did so.”71  
The court also noted that the images “were in closed files and thus not in plain 
view.”72  Additionally, since the government had removed the computers  to police 
custody there were no exigent circumstances or practical reasons to permit the 
warrantless search of the JPG files.73  The court concluded in Carey that once the 
detective viewed the contents of the first JPG file, the law required him to shut down 
his search for evidence of child pornography and apply for a separate warrant to 
search for child pornography before proceeding to open further JPG files.74  Because 
the officer did not follow this procedure, the court suppressed all evidence of child 
pornography.75 
Another recent case addresses these same issues in a somewhat different context.  
In United States v. Turner, an intruder with a knife awakened a woman in her 
bedroom at around 2:00 a.m..76  A neighbor in the adjacent apartment who claimed 
he was seated working at his computer at the time of the assault, telephoned police 
saying that he had observed someone fleeing his neighbor’s apartment.77  When 
police returned to the scene the next morning, they noticed that the victim’s window 
screens and those of the neighbor who had called police the prior morning were ajar 
and appeared to be smeared with blood.78  Police asked permission to search the 
apartment of the neighbor to look for evidence that the assailant had been in his 
apartment, suspecting that the assailant may have entered his apartment as well; he 
freely consented to the search.79 While searching the apartment, the computer screen 
suddenly illuminated and displayed a photograph of a nude woman who was 
physically similar to the neighbor who had been assaulted.80  Upon seeing this image, 
an officer seated himself at the suspect’s computer and began searching for recently 
accessed files.81  The officer opened a number of JPG files finding various images of 
nude women in bondage.82  Upon finding these files, the officer continued to search 
                                                                
70Id. at 1273. 
71Id. 
72Id. 
73Id. at 1275. 
74Carey, 172 F.3d at 1276. 
75Id. 
76United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84, 85 (1st Cir. 1999). 
77Id. 
78Id. 
79Id. at 85-86. 
80Id. at 86. 
81Turner, 169 F.3d at 85-86. 
82Id. 
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the hard drive for other files noting that several bore labels like “young” or “young 
with breasts.”83  When the officer opened these files, he found what he considered 
child pornography files and seized the computer.84   
In Turner,  the court held that the sexually suggestive image which suddenly 
came into “plain view’ did not make Turner’s computer and files subject to search 
just because the assault on his neighbor had a sexual component.85  The court noted 
that the search of the suspect’s computer files exceeded the scope of his consent.86  
When Turner consented to the search of his apartment for “evidence of an assault” 
this would reasonably mean physical evidence of the assault and not the type of 
documentary evidence one would expect to find stored on a computer hard drive.87  
Finding that the search exceeded the reasonable scope of the consent the court 
suppressed all evidence that the government had obtain in the warrantless search of 
Turner’s apartment.88    
Turner89 and Carey90 both illustrate the limits of the “plain view” doctrine with 
regard to closed computer files.  Carey91 illustrates that even with a proper warrant to 
search a suspect’s computer the scope of the search is limited by the terms of the 
warrant.  Where police are authorized to search for evidence of illegal drug activity 
stored on a computer it is not likely that this evidence will be stored in image or 
graphics files.  In Carey, the court accepted the government’s argument that image 
files could potentially show some evidence of illegal drug activity such as 
photographs of drugs or growing systems.92  This is absurd in the face of a warrant 
that was aimed at names, addresses, and other such documentary evidence of illegal 
drug activity.93  No reasonable person would expect lists of names and addresses to 
be found in a graphics file; this type of data would generally be stored in  word 
processing or data base files.94  Carey further allowed that once the officer opened 
                                                                
83Id. at 86. 
84Id. 
85Id. 
86Turner, 169 F.3d at 86. 
87Id. at 88-89. 
88Id. 
89Id. 
90Carey, 172 F.3d at 1268. 
91Id. at 1274. 
92Id. at 1271. 
93Id. at 1270. 
94Although the names or extensions of files (like .jpg or .gif) can be useful in determining 
what type of file one is looking at it is not entirely dispositive.  A computer user can choose to 
save a file with any name or extension they choose.  Thus, a criminal attempting to hide a 
database file could save it under a name that what would appear to be a graphics file.  Without 
information leading the government to believe that the suspect is engaged in this type of 
deception most file names are reasonable indications of the type of information contained in a 
file. 
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the initial graphics file (finding what he believed to be an image of child 
pornography) he could have used this finding as probable cause to support a search 
warrant to look for evidence of child pornography, even though the court correctly 
held that the image was not in “plain view.”95   
This analysis is flawed in two ways.  First, since it was not reasonable to open a 
graphics file under a warrant looking for evidence of illegal drug activity aimed at 
names, addresses, and other documentary evidence should not be allowed as 
probable cause for a warrant to investigate child pornography.  The initial opening of 
the first closed graphics file, which was not in “plain view,” was unreasonable and 
should invalidate any further search based on this information.  Second, in executing 
a search warrant for computerized data the government should be required to employ 
officers with sufficient knowledge to distinguish various types of computer files.  
The officer in Carey claimed that he did not initially know to distinguish a text file 
from an image or JPG file.96  If the government is not compelled to employ 
knowledgeable officers in executing searches of computers, citizens will be exposed 
to unreasonably broad searches of their computer files simply because the 
government employs ignorant personnel. The courts should set minimum standards 
for the training of personnel involved in investigations of computer based crimes.   
Turner provides that even if  an image comes into plain view on a computer 
screen this does not necessarily support expansion of a search to the contents of the 
computer’s memory and closed files.97  If the image does not relate to the evidence 
for which the officer has consent to search he or she cannot expand his or her search 
to the computer’s memory when this extension is not reasonable.98  In Turner, the 
image that came into “plain view” was a picture of a nude woman with “light-
colored hair.”99  This photograph was not evidence of any crime and did not support 
the officer’s review of closed computer files on Turner’s computer which went 
beyond the scope of Turner’s consent.100   
Three other cases illustrate situations where computer files or machine-readable 
media were considered to meet the definition of “plain view.”  In City of Akron v. 
Patrick, a suspect was under investigation for suspected illegal gambling activities.101  
Police executed a search warrant on the suspect’s home and observed two 
computers.102  The screen of one computer displayed the words “Advanced, 
Declined, Unchanged.”103  One officer, based on his experience, recognized these 
terms as relating to a gambling game based upon stock quotations and called in a 
police expert who determined that the computers were being used in a gambling 
                                                                
95Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273. 
96Id. at 1271. 
97Turner, 169 F.3d at 88. 
98Id. 
99Id. at 86. 
100Id. 
101City of Akron v. Patrick, 1982 WL 5049 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). 
102Id. at *1. 
103Id. 
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operation.104  Officers then seized the computers and various diskettes as evidence.105  
The defendant in Patrick argued that since the warrant did not specifically list the 
computers, the seizure was unlawful.106  One of the officers testified that when the 
computer screen displayed the words “Advanced, Declined, Unchanged” based on 
his experience and knowledge of gambling operations, he immediately recognized 
that the suspect was using the computers in an illegal gambling operation.107  
The court held that the officer’s observation of the words on the computer display 
was in “plain view” since the officer was legally in a position to view the computer 
screen, the incriminating character of the information on the computer screen was 
immediately apparent to the police officer, and the officer had the legal right to view 
the computer screen by virtue of the search warrant.108  This case is unlike Carey109 
and Turner110 where the government argued in an attempt to extend the “plain view” 
doctrine to closed files on the computer hard drive.  In Patrick, the “plain view” 
doctrine was applicable because the incriminating use of the computer was 
immediately apparent to the officers from the information displayed on the computer 
monitor.111  Patrick did not involve an attempt by the government to apply to “plain 
view” doctrine to closed files on the computer hard drive.112  Because the 
incriminating use of the computer was immediately apparent to the officers, the 
search and seizure fulfilled the requirements of the “plain view” doctrine in 
Patrick.113  The court allowed the seizure of the computers as gambling paraphernalia 
under the original search warrant.114  The opinion does not indicate that any further 
warrants were required to search the contents of the seized computer equipment.115 
In Oklahoma v. One Pioneer CD-ROM Changer, a suspect was under 
investigation for violations of state obscenity laws.116  Having purchased obscene CD 
ROMs from the suspect the police obtained a search warrant for the suspect’s 
home.117  While executing the warrant the officers came upon a large computer 
system the monitor of which displayed the words “viewing” and/or “copying” along 
                                                                
104Id. 
105Id. 
106Patrick, 1982 WL 5049 at *4. 
107Id. 
108Id. 
109Carey, 172 F.3d at 1268. 
110Turner, 169 F.3d at 84. 
111Patrick, 1982 WL 5049 at *4. 
112Id. 
113Id. 
114Id. 
115Id. 
116Oklahoma v. One Pioneer CD-ROM Changer, 891 P.2d 600 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994). 
117Id. at 604. 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss1/17
2000] COMPUTER SEARCHES AND SEIZURE 197 
with other descriptions like “lesbian sex” and/or “oral sex.”118  The court noted that 
the display of these words was in “plain view” during the search, making the 
incriminating use of the computer immediately apparent to the government, and 
therefore, the seizure of the computers was justified without a warrant under the 
“plain view” doctrine.119 
In Ivatury v Texas, police were investigating a defense industry espionage case.120  
The police executed a warrant for the search of the suspect’s safe deposit box for 
certain photographs and other evidence.121  The police discovered a computer tape 
among the contents of the safe deposit box and recognized it as a special type of tape 
used in the defense industry and seized it.122 The court held that the seizure met the 
requirements of the “plain view” doctrine noting that:  1)  the police possessed a 
valid search warrant for the safe deposit box; 2) police discovered the tape 
inadvertently; and 3) it was immediately apparent that the tape was contraband.123  
Here the officer recognized the tape as a special type used in the defense industry 
and as the type of tape the suspect had previously offered to sell him with stolen 
defense industry information.124   
Viewed together, these cases indicate that courts will not extend the “plain view” 
doctrine to unopened computer files on a computer hard drive.  When authorities fail 
to discover evidence of the crime for which they have a proper warrant or consent, 
the courts will not permit them to abandon this search in hopes of  finding evidence 
of other unspecified criminal activity.  In keeping with Coolidge,125 the cases 
involving computers and the “plain view” doctrine have not allowed extensions of 
general exploratory searches.  In addition, in Carey126 when an officer inadvertently 
came across evidence of another crime for which he did not have a valid warrant, the 
court required the officer to shut down the search and apply for further authorization 
from a neutral magistrate.  The three cases where the courts extended the “plain 
view” doctrine to computer files or computer media all involved cases where the 
computer screen clearly and prominently displayed evidence of a crime without any 
disturbance from the authorities or where the officers knew that an item of machine 
readable media was contraband from their prior dealings with the suspect.127  The 
courts did not, however, extend the “plain view” doctrine to closed computer files on 
a computer hard drive.   
                                                                
118Id. 
119Id. at 605. 
120Ivatury v. Texas, 792 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990). 
121Id. at 850. 
122Id. 
123Id. at 851. 
124Id. 
125Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466. 
126Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275. 
127One Pioneer CD-ROM Changer, 891 P.2d 600; Ivatury, 792 S.W.2d at 845; Patrick, 
1982 WL 5049.  
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Thus, although the cases dealing with computer systems are few in number as of 
this time, a general exploration of any and all closed files on a computer is not likely 
to be upheld by the courts nor will the closed files be found to fall under the “plain 
view” doctrine.  This approach is proper and in line with Hicks.128  If the mere 
movement of a stereo component a few inches was sufficient to violate the Fourth 
Amendment, the random opening of numerous closed computer files, when not 
properly authorized by a search warrant or covered by the scope of a consent, also 
violates the Fourth Amendment.     
IV.  INFORMANTS 
The Fourth Amendment limits state action with regard to searches and seizures.  
The limitations of the Fourth Amendment do not bind the actions of private parties.  
The Supreme Court has held that “a wrongful search or seizure conducted by a 
private party does not violate the Fourth Amendment and that such private 
wrongdoing does not deprive the government of the right to use evidence that it has 
acquired lawfully.”129  In Coolidge, the Court established that the court must 
determine if the private party acted as the “instrument or agent” of the government 
when the private party conducted the search.130  In United States v. Miller, the factors 
to be considered in determing if a private party acted as an instrument or agent of the 
government are listed as: “(1) whether the government knew of or acquiesced in the 
intrusive conduct, and (2) whether the party performing the search intended to assist 
law enforcement efforts or to further his own ends.”131   
The fact that there are but a few reported cases  involving private party searches 
of computers should not be taken as an indication that this situation does not raise 
serious privacy concerns.  Whenever  citizens take their computers for repair or 
upgrade, the equipment is exposed to the prying eyes of the technician who works on 
the equipment.  In the course of making the necessary repairs, the technician has  a 
legitimate need to access computer files to determine if the machine functions 
properly.  In this process, all of the computer’s files are potentially exposed to 
review by the technician.  This raises concerns in that, as we have seen, private 
parties are not bound by the limitations of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore, any 
evidence of suspected criminality could be reported to the police by the repair 
company and potentially used by the government to support a search warrant for the 
computer files.132  How courts viewed reports of potential evidence of criminality by 
informants played out differently in the reported cases as we will see. 
                                                                
128Hicks, 480 U.S. at 321. 
129Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980).  See also, Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 487-
90; United States v. Blocker, 104 F.3d 720, 725 (5th Cir. 1997). 
130Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 487. 
131United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 1982). 
132Although this will not be discussed in this note, the repair process raises client 
confidentially concerns for professionals like attorneys, accountants, or physicians who’s 
computers may contain client information that they are required, by the standards of their 
respective professions, to hold in confidence. 
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In United States v. Hall, a defendant took his computer to a computer repair 
company.133  A computer technician accessed several file directories in an attempt to 
diagnose the problems with the computer.134  The technician noted that some 
directories and files had unusual names that implied sexual content; one file was 
titled “Boys 612.”135  The technician viewed the file and found that it appeared to 
contain an image of young naked boys, who he estimated to be between ten and 
twelve years of age engaged in anal sex.136  The technician proceeded to view a 
number of other files that he also judged to contain images of child pornography and 
estimated that there were around 1,000 files on the hard drive that had names 
implying that they contained images of child pornography.137  The technician 
subsequently telephoned a member of the Illinois State Police, who was a personal 
friend of his, and informed him of what he had found on the computer.138  
At the request of police, the repair person copied a number of the images to a 
diskette which he gave to the police (according to the opinion no officers viewed the 
contents of the diskette).139  The police and FBI  requested that the repair company 
inform the customer that his computer repairs would take several additional days 
since the store needed to order additional parts.140  Using the informant’s descriptions 
of what he had viewed, but not the information on the diskette, the government 
obtained a warrant to search the customer’s computer and residence.141  The search 
of the computer hard drive confirmed that it contained child pornography and they 
prosecuted the customer for possession of the images.142  The defendant moved to 
suppress the evidence contending that it was discovered in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.143  The court found that the repairman’s viewing of computer files was 
done in the course of repairing a computer in the normal course of business with the 
sole purpose of repairing the computer.144  The Government had no knowledge of the 
repair and did not instruct the repair person to inspect the files; in fact, no 
government officials were contacted until after the files were discovered.145  The 
court further noted that the repairman’s “statements to law enforcement personnel 
formed a sufficient basis of probable cause to support the search warrants.  With 
                                                                
133United States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 991 (7th Cir. 1998). 
134Id. 
135Id. 
136Id. 
137Id. 
138Hall, 142 F.3d at 991. 
139Id. 
140Id. 
141Id. 
142Id. at 992. 
143Hall, 142 F.3d at 992. 
144Id. at 993. 
145Id. 
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lawfully issued warrants, the same files that [the repairman] copied onto disk for 
[police] were independently discovered by the Government. . .”146  Citing the 
independent source doctrine, the court allowed the admission of the evidence.147 
In United States v. Barth, a defendant took his computer to a self-employed 
computer consultant for repairs.148  In diagnosing the computer problems, the 
consultant happened upon and viewed several JPG files and observed images of 
child pornography.149  He then contacted an FBI agent who was his supervising agent 
as a confidential informant for the bureau.150  The agent instructed the consultant to 
copy all of the hard disk files onto diskettes and that the agent would have the 
diskettes picked up.151  The court found that the consultant’s initial viewing of the 
JPG files did not violate the Fourth Amendment because he did not intend to assist 
law enforcement officers when he initially viewed the file and merely did so in an 
effort to repair the computer.152  Once the consultant notified his supervising agent at 
the FBI and was instructed to view and copy additional files, the court concluded that 
these actions were attributable to the Government.153  Additionally, once the 
consultant had copied the contents of the hard disk to diskette, these files were 
subsequently viewed by law enforcement officials without the benefit of a search 
warrant.154  The court held that the search violated the two part test in Miller155 and 
ordered the evidence from the search of the defendant’s computer suppressed.156 
A third case, United States v. Harned, involving an informant resulted in the 
exclusion of evidence for an entirely different reason than the previous case.157  A 
customer had taken a computer to a repair shop for service and, in the course of 
testing the computer, the technician discovered a CD-ROM disk with files labeled 
with boys names.158  The technician viewed several of the files and felt that they 
depicted child pornography.159  The technician notified the police and an officer went 
                                                                
146Id. at 994. 
147Id. 
148United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp.2d 929 (W.D. Tex. 1998). 
149Id. at 932. 
150Id.  The opinion does not give any indication as to nature of the consultant’s 
involvement with the FBI but simply indicates that he was a confidential informant for the 
FBI. 
151Id. 
152Barth, 26 F. Supp.2d at 935-36. 
153Id. at 936. 
154Id. at 937. 
155United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 1982). 
156Barth, 26 F. Supp.2d at 942. 
157United States v. Harned, 182 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 1999). 
158Id. 
159Id. 
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to the repair shop to view several of the described files.160  The officer prepared a 
search warrant application and stated to the judge that there were around 489 files 
and that they involved acts of masturbation.161  The government subsequently 
indicted the defendant on child pornography charges.162  The defendant moved to 
suppress the evidence based on grounds that the officer had intentionally or 
recklessly included material false statements in his warrant application.163  The court 
found two falsehoods in the application: first, very few of the images involved 
depictions of both children and adults; and second, the description of the sexual acts 
as masturbation was found to be false.164  “The court also found that the affiant acted 
with reckless disregard for the truth by including those false statements in the 
affidavit.  Finally, the court held that the affidavit provided only a ‘bare conclusion’ 
insufficient for probable cause once the false statements were redacted.”165  The court 
found that the government based the warrant application  exclusively on “the 
conclusory statement of a computer store employee.”166  The court noted that what 
may have been an explicit sexual act involving child pornography to the computer 
store employee, may not have been so to a neutral magistrate.167  Neither the 
employee nor the officer who prepared the affidavit had sufficient experience to 
adequately judge the nature of the files they had viewed.168  The court suppressed all 
of the evidence and noted “that probable cause for a search warrant may not rest 
entirely upon the bare conclusion of a computer store employee as to the nature of 
the photographs.”169  
Certain guidelines are apparent from these three cases regarding use of third 
party informants.  Taking Barth170 and Hall171 together, it appears that government 
use of information from a private party search is a simple matter.  Since private 
searches do not implicate the protections of the Fourth Amendment, it would appear 
                                                                
160Id. 
161Id. 
162Harned, 182 F.3d at 928. 
163Id. 
164Id. 
165Id. 
166Id. 
167Harned, 182 F.3d at 928. 
168Id. 
169Id.  In another case involving a prosecution involving child pornography one expert 
testified at trial regarding how individuals who use computers to view child pornography, 
name, and organize their files. United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 
1998).  A second expert, with extensive expertise in determining the age children of children 
in images, provided testimony to determine that images were actually child pornography and 
to testify to  the age of the children portrayed in the images.  Id.  The determination of what 
constitutes child pornography is not a simple matter within the grasp of the average lay person.  
170Barth, 26 F. Supp.2d at 929. 
171Hall, 142 F.3d at 988. 
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that such information is readily usable by law enforcement.  In Barth however, if the 
private party acts as an “instrument or agent” of the government, the search may 
implicate Fourth Amendment considerations.  Barth172 tells us that if law 
enforcement provides direction to the third party with regard to expanding the 
private search and thus the additional intrusion by the third party is intended to assist 
law enforcement, the two part Miller173 test is violated.  In Hall,174 the Miller175 test 
was not violated because law enforcement used the information provided by the third 
party to apply for a search warrant only.  Law enforcement did not direct the third 
party in Hall to expand his search and the informant did not make the initial 
discovery of contraband  in an  attempt to assist law enforcement.176  In addition, in 
Barth,177 law enforcement officials viewed a number of computer files before 
obtaining a warrant; in Hall, the government testified that they had not viewed the 
contents of any files before obtaining a search warrant for the computer.178   
In the alternative, Harned179 indicates that courts may be reluctant to base 
probable cause on the conclusion of a layperson informant in certain situations.  
Judging what constitutes child pornography may require considerable expertise.  
Harned indicates that unless the third party informant has the expertise to properly 
evaluate the information he has found, his conclusions about the nature of the 
material may not be sufficient to support a search warrant.180  While the Harned181 
case involved child pornography, if a case involved such items such as financial, 
insurance or medical information, the government should be required to show that 
the informant had the proper expertise to judge the nature of the information he or 
she had viewed that was used as a probable cause for a search warrant application.  
Law enforcement must use care when using the results of third party information as a 
basis for broad searches of computer data.  Based on the cases reviewed above, 
defendants can challenge informant information if the informant’s actions implicated 
government action; if the government in any way directs the informants actions or 
views informant provided evidence prior to obtaining a warrant the courts have been 
reluctant to find the search valid.  In addition, the defendant can challenge the 
expertise of the informant in judging the nature of the information he or she has 
discovered if the evidence is of the type that generally require specialized training or 
knowledge to make a correct assessment of what the informant discovered.  Taken 
together, the cases to date indicate that although the government is free to  use 
information from private party searches the information must be properly evaluated, 
                                                                
172Barth, 26 F. Supp.2d at 936. 
173Miller, 688 F.2d at 657. 
174Hall, 142 F.3d at 993-94. 
175Miller, 688 F.2d at 657. 
176Hall, 142 F.3d at 993. 
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used with care, and the government must avoid directing the efforts of the informants 
with which the government has contact. 
V.  SCOPE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND PARTICULARITY OF WARRANTS 
A.  The Closed Container Analogy & Particularity of Warrants  
This note explained earlier that computer storage has been compared to other 
non-electronic closed containers for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
Analogizing computer storage to a closed container establishes a high level of Fourth 
Amendment protection for computer memory.  This analogy, however, does present 
certain problems.  When a small computerized address book or pager is compared to 
a closed container, this makes a great deal of sense since these devices will generally 
have the ability to store a limited amount of information all of which is similar.  
When applied to a larger computer storage device, such as a PC hard drive that has 
the ability to store a vast amount of information of various types, the closed 
container analogy is limited.  If the closed container analogy is applied to a large 
computer system, then a warrant issued for a search of the computer would allow for 
unlimited review of the entire contents of the computer’s memory.  If the computer 
contains information subject to lawful search and seizure which is intermingled with 
other information that is not evidence of any crime, should the police be required to 
do any initial sorting to determine what files are within the scope of the warrant or 
simply go randomly looking through any and all files they may encounter?  The 
courts have applied the closed container analogy to computer systems on a number 
of occasions. 
In United States v. Simpson, the police obtained a warrant to search for evidence 
of child pornography.182  In executing the warrant the police seized 19 videotapes, 18 
diskettes, a number of documents and the suspect’s entire computer.183  The 
defendant argued that the computer disks and hard drives are closed containers 
separate from the computer itself, and that in the absence of exigent circumstances, a 
separate search warrant to look at the contents of these components was required.184  
The court rejected this argument, finding that once a warrant was issued for search of 
child pornography files,  the computer and any components and storage devices on 
the computer were within the scope of the warrant since the evidence covered by the 
warrant could reasonably be found in computer storage.185  Essentially, the court 
used the closed container analogy making the entire contents of the computer storage 
subject to review without further supervision from a neutral magistrate.186  
                                                                
182United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 1998). 
183Id. 
184Id. at 1248. 
185Id. 
186In an earlier case the same court upheld the wholesale seizure to computer equipment 
where the warrant only specified that “equipment” could be seized without specifying that 
computers were included under this description. Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1478-79 
(10th Cir. 1997).  The court noted that the test for overbreadth of a warrant should be applied 
in a “common sense fashion.”  Id. at 1478.  The description need only be as specific as the 
nature of the activity under investigation allows.  Id.  In this case, where the police were 
searching for obscene materials, it could be reasonable to assume that computers could contain 
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In United States v. Lacey, the court allowed another wholesale seizure of a 
defendant’s computer system.187  The warrant application described the computer in 
generic terms and also allowed for seizure of any computer diskettes found at the 
scene.188  The government had probable cause to believe that the defendant had 
downloaded child pornography files but did not know if the images were stored on 
the computer’s hard disk or on one of many computer disks in the defendants 
possession.189  There was simply no way to specify what hardware and software had 
to be seized in order to retrieve the images.190  In addition, the court noted that the 
warrant application “established probable cause to believe that [the defendant’s] 
entire computer system was ‘likely to contain evidence of criminal activity.’”191  The 
court also found that the warrant contained objective limits to direct officers to the 
acceptable range of files that they could seize.192  The court allowed admission of the 
evidence and found no error in allowing the police to make a wholesale seizure of 
the computer equipment without any attempt to sort for relevant information on-
site.193 
The court in United States v. Musson permitted seizure of 54 computer diskettes 
for later review and sorting off-site under a warrant specifying “correspondence, 
memoranda, ledgers, and any records and writings of whatsoever nature” detailing 
transactions of certain companies.194  The defendant argued that seizure of the 
computer disks was outside the scope of the warrant since computer disks where not 
described in the warrant as an item to be seized and that the evidence on the disks 
should be excluded.195  The court noted that in the age of modern technology and the 
commercial availability of various storage media, it was not possible for a warrant to 
specify what form the records might take.196  Again, this consisted of a wholesale 
seizure of a large volume of intermingled documents without any need to attempt to 
sort them on-site.197 
                                                          
such items.  Id. at 1479.  The fact that computer equipment was not specifically listed in the 
warrant application was not considered relevant by the court.  Id.  The court noted that the 
only basis for invalidating warrants for overbreadth is where the language of a warrant 
authorizes the seizure of all documents without regard to their relevance to criminal activity.  
Davis, 112 F.3d 1478-89.  The court did not require the police to undertake any on-site sorting 
for relevant information as suggested in Tamura.  Id.   
187United States v. Lacey, 119 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 1996). 
188Id. at 746. 
189Id. 
190Id. at 746-47. 
191Id. at 746 (quoting United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
192Lacey, 119 F.3d at 746. 
193Id. at 746-47. 
194United States v. Musson, 650 F. Supp. 525, 531-32 (D. Colo. 1986). 
195Id. at 532. 
196Id.  
197A number of other cases allowed for wholesale seizure of computer equipment for later 
off-site sorting without additional approval from a magistrate essentially applying the closed 
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B.  The Problem of Intermingled Documents 
The problem of over broad searches and seizure arise when executing warrants to 
search the contents of computer storage devices.  The hard drives of computers 
frequently store information of various types and many people use their computers as 
repositories for both business and personal information.  The problem arises when 
information related to criminal activity and subject to lawful search and seizure is 
intermingled with personal information not subject to seizure that is likely to be the 
case with computer storage.  In Andresen v. Maryland, the Supreme Court 
recognized the problem of intermingled documents when it noted the following: 
We recognize that there are grave dangers inherent in executing a warrant 
authorizing the search and seizure of a person’s papers that are not necessarily 
present in executing a warrant to search for physical objects whose relevance is more 
easily ascertainable.  In searches for papers, it is certain that some innocuous 
documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they 
are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized. . . . In . . . searches, 
responsible officials, including judicial officials, must take care to assure that they 
are conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.198 
Because computers contain a large quantity and variety of information, police 
must conduct searches  carefully to prevent unwarranted intrusions on privacy 
warned of in Andresen.199 
In United States v. Tamura, the Ninth Circuit court addressed the problem of 
intermingled documents directly and formulated a special method for handling these 
searches.200  Although this search did not involve computer files, the principles apply 
well to search of computerized files.  In Tamura, the police had a warrant that listed 
three specific categories of accounting records that the government could properly 
seize.201  The records that the officers were looking for were intermingled with 
thousands of other accounting records and finding any one item of evidence involved 
                                                          
container analogy to computer equipment.  See, United States v. Longo, 70 F. Supp.2d 225 
(W.D.N.Y. 1999) (allowing broad search of computer files); United States v. Gawrysiak, 972 
F. Supp. 853 (D. N.J. 1997) (seizing all computer files without determination of those relevant 
to the scope of the search warrant was permissable and did not allow for blanket suppression 
of all evidence), aff’d, 178 F.3d 1281 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Kufrovich, 997 F. Supp. 
246 (D. Conn. 1997) (permitting blanket seizure of computer without any on-site sorting for 
evidence relevant to the crime under investigation); United States v. Stewart, No. CRIM.A. 
96-583, 1997 WL 189381 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 16, 1997) (allowing seizure of all computer hardware 
and software along with a large quantity of documents for later review off-site); United States 
v. Hersch, No. CRIM.A. 93-10339-Z, 1994 WL 568728 (D. Mass. Sept. 27, 1994) (finding 
that a search warrant calling for the seizure of all computer hardware, software and related 
equipment was not a general search given the complexity of the scheme under investigation). 
198Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 (1976). 
199Id. at 463. 
200United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982).  See also, United States v. 
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tracing the transaction through a string of printouts.202  After searching for records 
for a short time the agents felt that the process would take inordinate amounts of time 
unless the employees of the suspect company assisted them in their search.203  The 
employees refused to help the officers whereupon they seized all of the company’s 
accounting records for the years in question, removed the records to another location, 
and sifted through the records to extract the evidence at a later date.204  As a result of 
seizing all of the accounting records for several years, the government took large 
quantities of documents that the search warrant did not list.205   
In Tamura, the government argued that since the documents were intermingled 
and separating those described in the warrant from irrelevant ones was difficult, the 
wholesale seizure for later sorting off-site was reasonable.206  The suspect argued that 
the government should have remained on the premises until all relevant items were 
found or should have obtained an additional warrant to seize all of the accounting 
records.207  The court stated that such a wholesale seizure of items not listed in the 
warrant for later examination did not comport with the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment.208  The court stated that “[i]n the comparatively rare instances where 
. . .”  relevant and irrelevant documents are so intermingled such that sorting on-site 
is not practical, the court stated that the government should seal the records and a 
neutral magistrate should approve any further search.209  “If the need for transporting 
the documents is known to the officers prior to the search, they may apply for 
specific authorization for large-scale removal of material, which should be granted 
only where on-site sorting is infeasible and no other practical alternative exists.”210  
The Tamura court noted that the essential safeguard is that in a wholesale removal of 
documents a neutral magistrate must monitor the process.211  Simply because 
wholesale removal is convenient to the government, when a neutral magistrate has 
not monitored it, does not make it reasonable.212  The court did note, however, that 
“where the Government’s wholesale seizures were motivated by considerations of 
practicality rather than by a desire to engage in indiscriminate ‘fishing’” the seizure 
may be reasonable.213  In Tamura, the government found it convenient to seize a 
large volume of paper documents containing both relevant and irrelevant 
information.  Government seizure of an entire personal computer and hard disk that 
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is small and easy to transport for later off-site sorting may be a tempting alternative.  
In addition, in the age of computerization, the cases of intermingled documents will 
no longer be comparatively rare but more than likely the case. Next we will examine 
several cases that apply elements of the Tamura test to computer search and seizure. 
In United States v. Upham, the government obtained a warrant to search a 
suspect’s computer for images of child pornography.214  The warrant listed material 
to be seized with particularity and among other items it authorized seizure of “any 
and all computer software and hardware, . . . computer disks, disk drives . . . Any and 
all visual depictions, in any format or media, of minors engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct.”215  The court indicated that if the images could have been obtained easily 
by on-site inspection and sorting there would be no justification for wholesale 
seizure of the computer hardware that contained intermingled relevant and irrelevant 
files.216  However, the court went on to note that it is not an easy task to search every 
item of a hard drive, here even searching for previously deleted information that the 
police recovered, looking for relevant information.217  The record in this case showed 
that the off-site search for images could not have readily been done on-site and based 
on considerations of practicality the court allowed the wholesale seizure.218  The 
warrant in Upham fulfilled the requirements of Tamura in that the warrant 
specifically authorized, in advance, the wholesale seizure of the computer equipment 
allowing the later off-site sorting of the information.219  In an additional twist the 
court allowed admission of evidence of images that the suspect had previously 
deleted from his hard drive, finding that the recovered files were competent evidence 
of possession of the images prior to their deletion.220  The government used a utility 
program to recover the previously deleted material and the court found that this “is 
not different than decoding a coded message lawfully seized or pasting together 
scraps of a torn-up ransom note.”221 
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United States v. Sissler involved a prosecution for sale and distribution of illegal 
drugs in which the police executed a search warrant authorizing the seizure of drugs, 
related paraphernalia, proceeds, records of drug transactions, records of marijuana 
customers, and suppliers among other items.222  Officials seized a large number of 
documents, around five hundred computer disks and a personal computer.223  Both 
the computer and disks contained a large number of items that the search warrant did 
not authorize.224  Citing Tamura, the court noted that practical considerations 
justified the large seizure and not a desire to go on an indiscriminate “fishing” 
expedition.225  Regarding the computer and the disks, the court noted that the 
suspects had often used passwords and other security devices to prevent access to the 
stored files and as such accessing the computer files was a relatively complex and 
time consuming procedure.226  The police brought in a computer expert to “crack” 
these security measures and gain access to the information, a process that took a 
great deal of time and effort and could not reasonably be accomplished on-site.227 
United States v. Abram involved another situation in which the police seized a 
large volume of items beyond those described in the warrant, and the seizure was 
found to violate the test in Tamura.228  The warrant authorized agents to seize 
information primarily related to insurance income proceeds and premium payments 
and also computers and related equipment.229  The government seized entire filing 
cabinets, a computer and a small green filing box without making any review of the 
contents before the seizure.230  One officer later testified that it took no more than 
five to ten minutes to review the contents of the seized items to determine if they 
contained evidence relevant to the investigation and that undertaking this review on-
site would not have been burdensome.231  The court found that this case was unlike 
Tamura where practical considerations motivated the wholesale seizure, and found 
that agents have seized all documents they found simply for their own convenience 
without any review regarding relevance.232  The court found that the agents had acted 
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“in flagrant disregard for the terms of the search warrant issued” and ordered all 
evidence suppressed.233   
The approach set forth in Tamura234 is a useful one which should be followed.  If 
applied properly, the Tamura235 procedure will provide that legitimate searches of 
computers are conducted in the least intrusive way possible.  There are, however, 
problems with the approach as proposed in Tamura.236  Although the court suggested 
that when wholesale seizure is to be anticipated, this should be indicated in the initial 
application for a search warrant.  But the court went on to note that when the police 
arrive on the scene and find that practical considerations make on-site sorting for 
relevant information impossible, a wholesale seizure of files and equipment may be 
justified even if authority to do so was not applied for in advance.  While there have 
been a limited number of cases involving computer search and seizure that followed 
Tamura,237 it appears all too easy for police to show “practical considerations” to 
justify wholesale seizure and later off-site sorting for relevant information.  Taken 
together, Sissler238 and Upham239 indicate that  courts accept the assertion of 
“practical considerations” all too readily.  In addition, there was no information in 
Upham240 and Sissler241 to suggest that the later off-site sorting was further 
supervised by judicial authority as Tamura242 suggested was appropriate.  In 
Abram,243 the court excluded the evidence only because the government admitted 
that they made no attempt to sort the information prior to the wholesale seizure of the 
intermingled files.   
The government’s actions should not need to rise to this level to invoke the 
protections of Tamura.244  How long should the government be required to stay on-
site to sort for relevant documents?  The courts simply do not provide any objective 
standards against which to judge the reasonableness of the government’s assertion of 
“practical considerations” when providing a justification for a wholesale seizure of 
computer equipment. One can hardly imagine any case involving search of a 
computer hard drive, that may contain tens of thousands of intermingled relevant and 
irrelevant files, where a case could not be made that it is impracticable to sort 
through this mass of data on-site.  Indeed, such a process would be time consuming.  
On the other hand, operating systems like Windows provides search engines which 
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allow one to quickly narrow the search for relevant documents.  It could be argued 
that searching for relevant documents on a computer hard drive, with the aid of 
search engines and utility programs, may actually be more efficient than manually 
searching through a large paper file cabinet unaided by technology.  Allowing  
wholesale seizure of entire computers allows possible intrusions into private matters 
that have no relevance to commission of any crime.  In addition, a computer user 
may make use of the equipment for a variety of purposes both criminal and 
legitimate.  If the entire computer is seized to allow off-site sorting for relevant 
information, the users entire legitimate, business and personal life may be 
unreasonably disrupted in the process.  A citizen should be able to pursue his 
legitimate business interests even while under investigation for an alleged criminal 
violation.  Only through strict application of the Tamura approach to computer 
searches and seizures can peoples’ legitimate privacy interests be adequately 
protected.  The courts have simply applied the Tamura245 approach far too carelessly. 
The cases applying the closed container analogy to computer searches and 
seizures and allowing wholesale seizure of equipment for later off-site sorting are far 
more numerous than the cases which follow the Tamura246 approach.  Taken 
together, these “closed container” cases present several dangers.  First, the 
government is given virtually free rein to seize computer systems and computer 
storage media when such items are not specified in the warrant.  The courts have 
upheld, on many occasions, very broadly worded warrants.  Second, unlike the 
Tamura247 approach, these cases do not require the government to undertake any on-
site sorting of relevant from irrelevant documents or a showing of practical 
considerations that such on-site sorting is not possible prior to a wholesale seizure of 
computer equipment.  The privacy interests of the citizen who is under investigation 
are weighed against the convenience of the government in performing their 
investigative functions, and the balance is struck in favor of the interests of 
government convenience.  If the government is compelled to follow the Tamura248 
approach, computer searches and seizures will be undertaken in the least intrusive 
way possible.  This, however, is not the trend in which computer search and seizure 
cases are headed; the trend is headed, in fact, in the direction of allowing searches 
and seizures to be undertaken in a manner that allows greater and greater invasion of 
government into personal privacy.  
VI.  THE SUBPOENA PROCESS 
Thus far this note has examined searches and seizures of computers in the context 
of search warrants and the different approaches that courts have taken in construction 
of warrants.  There have been a limited number of cases involving government 
attempts to gain access to computerized evidence of a crime that involved grand jury 
subpoenas rather than search warrants.  Reported cases of this process are few in 
number. They do, however, provide useful lessons with regard to how investigations 
of crimes that involve computers, at least in certain contexts, may be more 
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appropriately undertaken.  The subpoena process  generally analogizes computer 
equipment to a file cabinet rather than the “closed container” analogy that we have 
already examined. 
In re Horowitz involved a grand jury subpoena for records that were not 
computerized.249  The subpoena required a suspect’s accountant to produce “the 
contents of all three file cabinets” located at the accountant’s office.250  Prior to the 
production of any documents the accountant challenged the subpoena arguing that 
the request for the contents of entire file cabinets, without regard to the relevance of 
what they contained, was overly broad.251  The district court narrowed the subpoena 
to exclude personal documents contained in the filing cabinets.252  The Second 
Circuit further narrowed the subpoena indicating that “the government must make a 
minimal showing that, in light of other evidence that has been obtained, the paper 
may be relevant to the grand jury’s investigation of a federal crime.”253  The court 
allowed that if the defendants can show “that a particular category of documents can  
have no conceivable relevance to any legitimate object of investigation” they need 
not be produced.254  This decision indicates that subpoenas should not be directed at 
whole filing cabinets, but at categories of documents that the cabinets may contain 
that may be relevant to investigation of a crime.  Essentially, the person served with 
a subpoena is permitted to sort through and produce only documents relevant to the 
crime under investigation. 
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum,255 the court applied the approach in Horowitz256 
directly to a subpoena aimed at computer equipment.257  The subpoena demanded 
production of computer hard drives, and floppy disks that the grand jury conceded 
contained information irrelevant to the investigation rather than being directed at 
categories of information contained on the computerized media.258  The court noted 
that the government admitted that the subpoena demanded production of various 
irrelevant documents and that a “key word” search would readily reveal which items 
where relevant to the investigation.259  The court went on to note that if the grand 
jury had reason to believe that relevant documents were being withheld, a court 
appointed expert could be used to search the computer equipment for relevant 
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information.260  The subpoena was quashed in its entirety since it unnecessarily 
demanded that irrelevant documents be produced.261   
The file cabinet analogy is much more appropriate to a search of computer files 
than the closed container analogy that has been predominately followed regarding 
search and seizure of computer files.  The closed container analogy allows for 
unlimited intrusion into the contents of a computer’s storage without a showing of 
relevance.  Just as police sort through the contents of paper filing cabinets, seizing 
only those documents that appear relevant to their investigation, so should they be 
required to sort through the storage devices of computers that are the object of 
investigation.  First, it appears from the case law that courts are simply too willing to 
allow wholesale seizure of computers containing intermingled relevant and irrelevant 
documents.  Second, we must ask why police tend to cart away entire computers 
while not taking with them large numbers of filing cabinets?  The answer is simple--
an entire personal computer is small and weighs only around fifteen pounds and is 
easy to take.  It is not so simple to cart off the entire contents of ten or fifteen file 
cabinets full of paper documents. 
The subpoena process, unlike the use of search warrants, requires the government 
to make some showing of relevance prior to the production of documents that are 
requested.  In addition, the person served with a subpoena has the right to challenge 
the request prior to production of any of the information.  This additional protection 
is not available to a citizen served with a search warrant.  The Supreme Court noted 
that a search warrant is preferable in circumstances where it “is necessary to secure 
and to avoid the destruction of evidence.”262  The cases involving subpoenas 
involved financial and business related crimes in which destruction of evidence is 
not great a danger.  First, if the focus of the subpoena is a professional, like the 
accountant in Horowitz,263 the person served with the subpoena may not be under 
investigation but merely in possession of relevant records.  There would be, 
therefore, no motivation to destroy evidence to avoid prosecution.  Second, if the 
crime involves a financial scheme, relevant documents are likely to be found in the 
possession of persons other than those suspected of criminal activities.  If the crime 
involved customers, banks, or other financial institutions, copies of relevant 
documents can be obtained from these sources even if the suspect destroys 
computerized records in the face of a subpoena.  In addition, destruction of 
documents relevant to a grand jury subpoena would constitute an additional crime 
for which the suspect can be prosecuted.264  Thus, in investigations of more complex 
financial transactions, where the possibility of destruction of evidence is not as great, 
the subpoena process should be the preferred approach. 
VII.  CONCLUSION  
The Fourth Amendment provides an adequate framework for the protection of 
personal privacy interests against unreasonably intrusive searches and seizures of 
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computers and computer data.  This framework, however, is only adequate if the 
courts interpret the contours of the Fourth Amendment in the context of changing 
times and circumstances.  The advent of the widespread use of computer technology 
by large segments of the population to store a variety of information, presents the 
legal system with new and interesting challenges.   
Several doctrines are apparent from the review of this emerging area of the law.  
First, the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement will not be applied by 
the courts to closed files in computer storage.  The only way in which a computer 
can be seized under the “plain view” doctrine, is in the event that some relevant 
evidence of criminality is prominently displayed on the computer screen.  These 
cases are few in number with most searches aimed at the closed contents of computer 
memory.  In such cases, the contents of computer storage are considered to carry a 
high level of Fourth Amendment protection and require a warrant to examine the 
contents of any files. 
Second, although informant information can prove useful to the government, any 
such information must be used with great care.  If the circumstances of the 
informant’s actions are directed by or motivated by a desire aid the government, the 
informant provided information will not be useable.  In addition, in cases where 
judging the nature of the content of computer files requires expertise, courts may not 
find the conclusions of the informant dispositive or a proper basis to support 
probable cause for a warrant.  Judging what constitutes child pornography may not 
be within the grasp of average citizens.  Defendants may be able to successfully 
challenge the state’s use of conclusory informant statements.   
The reported cases to date indicate that search warrants for computers are 
construed broadly and the analogy of the closed container is used by most courts in 
establishing the scope of the searches and seizures.  This analogy is dangerous.  If 
viewed as a closed container, a warrant authorizing search of computer memory 
provides a virtually unlimited right, on the part of the police, to review the contents 
of any files with any sorting as to relevance.  Once you have the right to open a 
closed container that means that you may look at anything contained therein.  This 
analogy is too simplistic and allows for search and seizure of computer to proceed in 
a very intrusive manner and should be abandoned. 
The Ninth Circuit in Tamura265 proposed that computer storage should be 
analogized to a filing cabinet.  This approach recognizes certain aspects of computer 
storage that the closed container analogy ignores.  First, a computer hard drive often 
contains tens of thousands of files that contain a mixture of personal files, in which 
the state does not have a legitimate interest, intermingled with those that may contain 
evidence of some crime.  Tamura266 suggests that police should be required to 
perform on-site sorting of computer data to isolate relevant from irrelevant, and 
possibly highly personal, data if at all possible.   If on-site sorting is not possible, the 
later sorting requires supervision from an independent magistrate and a showing of 
the practical considerations that prevented the on-site sorting.  In addition, Tamura267 
held that if the police feel that wholesale seizure of computer equipment will be 
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required, approval for this should be obtained in advance at the time of warrant 
application.  The courts have, however, been all too willing to accept the 
government’s assertions of practical considerations making on-site sorting of data 
impossible.  The Tamura268 approach is not valuable unless the courts apply its 
requirements strictly and consistently the state’s interests and convenience will 
continue to be placed above those of personal privacy. 
Finally, as an additional protection against invasion of personal privacy, the 
subpoena process should be the preferred approach to investigations of computer 
based crime if at all possible.  Unlike the warrant search the legal process is available 
to challenge overly broad subpoenas prior to producing the information.  Generally 
some minimal showing of relevance is required for subpoena to survive a challenge 
as to breadth.  Obviously, the subpoena process is only appropriate in certain cases 
where the destruction of evidence is not probable.  This may be the case in 
investigations or complex financial schemes.  In child pornography cases, 
destruction of evidence is a real possibility and warrants should be used, but the 
warrants should be used in strict compliance with the requirements of Tamura.269 
If these suggestions are followed, search and seizure of computers will proceed in 
a manner that properly balances the interest of society in prosecuting crime with 
those of personal privacy such that the process proceeds in the least intrusive manner 
possible.  If the courts continue down the road of liberalizing search and seizure in 
favor of the convenience of the government, the trend towards erosion of Fourth 
Amendment privacy protections will continue.  The courts can and should stop this 
trend. 
DONALD RESSEGUIE 
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